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dx.d“The tools that the new economic historian inherited from the economistwere not intended to deal with long-run economic change…
The economist not only accepted tastes, technology, and population as given, but also he accepted equally the current basic ground
rules within which both market and non-market decisions were made. For that matter, the theory did not recognize the possibility of
making economic decisions via the political process. Information was assumed to be perfect and costless.”Douglas North (1971).1. Introduction
The goal of this special issue, which we dedicate to the late Nobel Laureate Douglas North, one of the most proliﬁc and inﬂu-
ential economists of the twentieth century, is to encourage new socio-economic research on the relationship between institutions
and well-being. North passed away on November 15, 2015, days after his 95th birthday, but his legacy in the ﬁeld of economics
will long be remembered. He popularized an innovative way of thinking about the big questions in economics—e.g., what makes
some countries rich and others poor—by emphasizing the essential role of institutions in shaping economic and political incen-
tives and human interactions. For him, the ultimate explanation for many economic and social phenomena is found precisely
in the type of factors that many economists before him took for granted. In the spirit of Douglas North, this special issue is ded-
icated to the study of institutions, or as he deﬁned them “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and
social interactions.” We believe that having a special issue on the topic of “Institutions & Well-being” is timely and relevant for at
least three reasons.
First, institutions matter. While it is by now clear that achieving economic growth and prosperity depends on the complex in-
teraction of many factors—policy, culture, geography, legal origins—perhaps even a fair amount of luck, development economists
increasingly refer to institutions as one of the most important and “deep” determinants for sustained economic prosperity
(Acemoglu et al., 2005a, 2005b; Economides and Egger, 2009). Some economists even suggest that institutions are now at the
forefront of mainstream economic theory (Jones and Romer, 2009). Institutions, as North (1990, p. 111) suggests “shape the sub-
jective mental constructs that individuals use to interpret the world around them and make choices. Moreover, by structuring the
interaction of human beings in certain ways, formal institutions affect the price we pay for our actions.” In that sense, institutions
play a vital role in reducing transaction costs and shaping the appropriate incentives that drive long-run economic growth and
development. The ideologies that people have can also inﬂuence how they interact with each other and ultimately determine
their subjective experiences and satisfaction with various aspects of their lives.
Second, most of the previous research in the ﬁeld has focused on establishing the relevance of institutions to economic out-
comes such as growth in GDP per capita and individual income. Well-being, however, is a multidimensional concept that requires
looking not merely at the health of the economic system, but also at a variety of other human experiences and conditions such as
civic engagement, community values, health, education, social networks, safety, freedom, or psychological well-being and its many
sub-domains; including life satisfaction, positive and negative emotions, meaning, self-esteem, optimism, or positive engagement.
Many of these well-being dimensions are strongly correlated with economic development. But there are also striking discrepan-
cies, especially when it comes to how people perceive their lives are going (Stiglitz et al., 2009). Oil-rich countries in the Middle
East, for instance, have some of the highest levels of GDP per capita in the world, yet they lack some basic human freedoms and
signiﬁcantly lag behind with regard to human rights, education, and other important well-being dimensions. While good institu-
tions are an end in themselves, studying the relationship between different types of institutions and these well-being dimensions
can signiﬁcantly enrich our understanding of the consequences of institutions and help instruct public policy.x.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.001
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2 EditorialThis is particularly important today because in recent years the measurement of socio-economic progress has started under-
going a fundamental change. Starting with the seminal work of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic and Social
Progress in 2009 (Stiglitz et al., 2009), a variety of initiatives around the world have been launched that aim to provide a more
complete picture of socio-economic progress. The OECD, for example, is now tracking individual well-being in eleven distinct
quality of life categories using both objective and subjective indicators—from material standards of living and work-life balance
to subjective indicators of health and life satisfaction. Gallup is now collecting data on human thriving and happiness in more
than 140 countries. A World Happiness Report that tracks not only the level of happiness, but also its distribution, has been pub-
lished annually since 2012. The New Economic Foundation (NEF) is collecting data on national well-being for 22 European coun-
tries on multiple aspects of subjective well-being such as life evaluation, emotions, vitality, autonomy, meaning, trust, supportive
relationships, resilience, self-esteem, optimism, and positive functioning. An increasing number of countries, including leading
economies such as the UK, now have distinct national well-being accounts.1 The World Bank now reports, as part of the World
Development Indicators, estimates of genuine investment which captures the evaluation of intertemporal social welfare
(Dasgupta, 2009; Fleurbaey, 2009). This shift is now quickly gaining momentum.2
Finally, improving well-being is not only an important social-economic objective and something that most people strive for, it
is also an individual and collective resource that can lead to many objective beneﬁts and drive social progress. Healthier, wealth-
ier, happier and more educated people can transform the social fabric of society, which can lead to higher levels of political par-
ticipation, and in the long-run increase the likelihood of the development and persistence of good institutions (Lipset, 1959).
More educated nations, for instance, are more likely to have higher levels of tolerance and trust, lower transaction costs and
crime, and be more politically engaged (Lochner, 2011). Subjective well-being has also been linked to many objective
beneﬁts—from health and pro-social behavior to higher income and productivity (De Neve et al., 2013). In other words, pursuing
well-being is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable. We believe that a better understanding of the relationship between in-
stitutions and well-being can offer many unique insights into some of the vexing barriers to achieving sustained well-being and of
the consequent conditions most conductive to improving quality of life.
The articles in this special issue contribute to our understanding of institutions and well-being along at least one of three mar-
gins described above. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on institutions and well-being, followed in Section 3 by a
synopsis of the papers in this issue and how they contribute to this literature. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.
2. A brief literature review
Since the early days of economics as a distinct discipline, often associated with the release of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Na-
tions, economists have sought to understand the fundamental causes of social progress and human prosperity. Classical econo-
mists such as Smith, John Stuart Mill, and David Ricardo stressed the importance of institutions, public policy, and the rule of
law in shaping economic performance and human well-being. As economics became increasingly formalized throughout the
twentieth century, and particularly with the development of neo-classical growth models, the explanation for differences in eco-
nomic development and material well-being across the world began to focus on the accumulation of physical and human capital
(Solow, 1956; Koopmans, 1965; Lucas, 1988). As Easterly and Levine (2001) recognized, however, factor accumulation is unable
to explain the majority of the variation in income and growth differences in cross-country growth regressions. Easterly and Levine
noted that the residual, often referred to as total factor productivity (TFP), has the most explanatory power, and called for econ-
omists to focus on the determinants of TFP as a means to better understand economic growth.
Most neoclassical growth models treat the production process as a “black box” in which quantities of labor, capital, and tech-
nology are somehow combined to produce goods and services, ascribing differences in these variables as the causes of economic
prosperity. But why and how societies choose to invest in new technology or human capital is often left unexplained. Along these
lines, North and Thomas (1973, p. 2) suggest that factors such as innovation, economies of scale, education, and capital accumu-
lation “are not causes of growth; they are growth.” Acemoglu (2009, p. 109) adds: “…any explanation [of growth] that simply
relies on technology, physical capital, and human capital differences across countries is, at some level, incomplete. There must
be other, deeper reasons that we will refer to as “fundamental causes” of economic growth. It is these reasons that are preventing
many countries from investing enough in technology, physical capital, and human capital.” In other words, variables such as tech-
nology and human and physical capital are only proximate causes of economic growth and prosperity, but are insufﬁcient as fun-
damental explanatory causes. The experience of the transition economies at the end of the last decade furthermore suggests that
factors of production are incapable of delivering growth without the appropriate institutional environment (Eicher and Garcia-
Penalosa, 2006). The work of Nikolova (this issue), for example, shows that even the glaring happiness gap between transitioning
and advanced economies is now closing, largely due to improvements in institutions such as the rule of law.
Increasingly, economists are interested in understanding the fundamental, long-run causes of economic growth and develop-
ment. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013, p. 325) provide a review of the burgeoning literature examining the so-called “deep roots” of
economic development, which include a host of factors that “have been transmitted across generations over the very long run”1 The Ofﬁce of National Statistics (ONS) published 41measures of National well-being, organized by ten “domains” including health, what we do, andwherewe live.
Themeasures include both objective variables such as the unemployment rate and subjective ones such as the percentage of peoplewho felt safewalking alone at dark.
2 There are a large number of other recent initiatives that attempt to go beyond GDP to track human progress, including the Legatum Prosperity Index, the Social
Progress Index, the Happy Planet Index, the Sustainable Economic Development Assessment, and the Economist's “Where to Be Born” Index, among others.
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“Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the under-
lying determinant of economic performance.”
Institutions, as North (1991) deﬁnes them, “consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes
of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” According to North (1990), formal rules are created by the
state while informal rules are part of the heritage we call “culture.” The role of institutions throughout history, as North (1990)
explains, has been to create order and reduce uncertainty. This is how institutions are directly related to economic outcomes
by reducing transaction costs, risk, and hence the total cost of production. Bjørnskov (this issue), using post-Cold War data on
212 economic crises in 175 countries, shows that institutions consistent with the principles of economic freedom are associated
with a lower risk of economic crises, as measured by smaller peak-to-through ratios and shorter recovery time.
Even more importantly, institutions determine the “rules of the game” and shape the relative rewards from different social,
economic, and political activities such as innovation, investment in education, or rent seeking. In this sense, institutions can be
seen as “deep” determinants of the allocation of entrepreneurial talent to different productive, unproductive and even destructive
social activities that lead to a variety of well-being outcomes (Baumol, 1990).
North's theory about institutions and economic performance has exerted a lasting impact on the social sciences, undoubtedly
inﬂuential at spurring interest in the measurement of economic, legal and political institutions as a means to empirically test his
hypothesis. Indeed, a stream of empirical papers (e.g., De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and
Jones, 1999; de Haan and Sturm, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dawson, 2003; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004;
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2006) have tested North's hypothesis using a variety of institutional measures, reaching a “close
to intellectual consensus that the political institutions of limited government cause economic growth” (Glaeser et al., 2004,
p. 272).
Formal economic institutions such as competitive markets, the banking system, or the structure of property rights are especial-
ly important for economic progress because they fundamentally inﬂuence how society invests in human capital, physical capital,
and technology, as well as how production is organized. Using genetic diversity as a plausible source of exogenous variation, Faria
et al. (this issue) provide strong evidence for a potentially causal link between institutions, measured by the Economic Freedom of
the World index, and long-run economic growth. The results in their study also highlight the importance of human capital, ap-
proximated by cognitive skills, as an important determinant of economic institutions. Their analysis suggests a more dynamic
view of development in which institutions lead to economic development, but higher levels of physical and human capital can
improve the quality of economic and political institutions, creating a virtuous cycle.
Institutional economists have thus tried to identify the consequences of “imperfect institutions” (Eggertsson, 2005, p.1), essen-
tially expanding neoclassical growth models to include institutions as the underlying mechanism that drives development. The
relationship between corruption and genuine wealth creation, for instance, is strong and negative: simply put, the most corrupt
countries are also the poorest ones (Aidt, 2009, 2011). While some economists believe that institutional economics does not fun-
damentally challenge the tools of neoclassical growth models (Brousseau and Glanchant, 2008; Joskow, 2008), many others con-
sider institutions as the main determinant of economic growth (Economides and Egger, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2005a, 2005b).
Recent studies have also emphasized the importance of cultural institutions (for a review see Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
There is strong evidence, for instance, that the value dimension individualism-collectivism is one of the strongest cultural deter-
minants of economic growth and prosperity (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011). Individualistic cultures that place value on per-
sonal freedom, self-reliance, creative expression, affective autonomy, and reward individuals for their accomplishments with
higher social status tend to experience faster rates of innovation and economic growth compared to more collectivist societies.
Using subjective well-being data from eleven Central and Eastern European countries, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani (this
issue), furthermore, ﬁnd that evading taxes is negatively associated with individuals’ life satisfaction. This relationship is largely
shaped by people's perception of formal and informal tax-related institutions and social capital.
Despite the growing body of theoretical and empirical research that shows that institutions are strongly correlated with better
economic outcomes, it is by now also clear that institutions are endogenous. As Rodrik (2004, p.1) notes: “rich countries are [also]
those where investors feel secure about their property rights, the rule of law prevails, private incentives are aligned with social
objectives, monetary and ﬁscal policies are grounded in solid macroeconomic institutions, idiosyncratic risks are appropriately
mediated through social insurance, and citizens have recourse to civil liberties and political representation” to demand better po-
litical institutions and inﬂuence the formation of economic institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2005a, 2005b), for example, build a dy-
namic model in which economic institutions determine economic performance, but economic institutions are determined by the
distribution of political power, which then determines political institutions and the distribution of resources. Much of this litera-
ture assumes that institutions are the consequences of choices made by domestic actors constrained by domestic factors. In real-
ity, many international factors also play a role: international trade, international factor mobility, foreign investment, development
aid, or open or covert foreign intervention by foreign powers (e.g., Antràs, and Padró i Miquel, 2011; Aidt and Albornoz, 2011).
Dutta and Williamson (this issue) provide some support for the hypothesis that foreign aid can help poor countries improve
their economic institutions, but only when good political institutions are already present. Nejad and Young (this issue), using ev-
idence from bilateral migration ﬂows, furthermore show that economic institutions, particularly property rights and the rule of
law, are a signiﬁcant pull factor for potential migrants.
In which direction the causality between institutions and economics outcomes goes and what are the exact mechanisms
through which institutions work is still highly debated in the economic development literature. Glaser et al. (2004), for instance,
suggest that most measures of formal institutions are simply inadequate for the task to establish the “deep” determinants ofPlease cite this article as: Bennett, D.L., et al., Institutions and well-being, European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://
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to economic prosperity in the sense that if a poor country improves the quality of its institutions in the direction of stronger pro-
tection of property rights, it is likely to experience higher levels of economic prosperity (Rodrik, 2004). Developing a new measure
of democratic institutions, the Support Vector Machine Democracy index, Gründler and Krieger (this issue) contributes to this lit-
erature. They report a robust positive relationship between the new democracy index and economic growth, and suggest that de-
mocracy exerts inﬂuence on growth through better education, higher investment shares, and lower fertility rates, but not
necessarily higher levels of redistribution.
More recent studies have started examining the relationship between formal and cultural institutions, and variety of other ob-
jective and subjective social outcomes such as trust, tolerance, crime, poverty, or subjective well-being. Berggren and Nilsson (this
issue), for example, ﬁnd suggestive evidence that the institutions of economic freedom increase tolerance, measured by the will-
ingness to let atheists, homosexuals and communists speak, keep books in libraries and be a college level teacher. They suggest
that this relationship may work through reducing feelings of tension and conﬂict. In this sense, institutions may play a vital
role in creating a non-discriminatory and inclusive environment that fulﬁlls the basic psychological need for relatedness.
An important insight from this literature, for instance, is that institutions may have a positive impact on psychological well-
being beyond their direct impact on variety of socio-economic outcomes: a concept known as procedural utility (Frey et al.,
2004). The idea here is that people care not merely about outcomes, but also about the processes that lead to these outcomes.
In this respect, institutions may provide an independent source of utility by inﬂuencing how individuals perceive their own
sense of self. Individuals, for instance, may experience a higher level of subjective well-being if they believe that they are treated
in a way they consider just or fair regardless of the material outcomes (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). For instance, the right to partic-
ipate in the political process, measured by the extent of direct democratic rights across regions, is strongly correlated with sub-
jective well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Nikolaev and Bennett (this issue) show that people who live in countries with
institutions consistent with the principles of economic freedom experience a greater perception of freedom of choice and control
over their life. They furthermore ﬁnd suggestive evidence that a potential mechanism that explains this relationship is the percep-
tion of procedural fairness and social mobility.
An emerging literature on the relationship between formal institutions and subjective well-being also ﬁnds a positive correla-
tion between the institutions of economic freedom and subjective well-being, most often proxied by survey measures of life sat-
isfaction (for a review of this literature see Spruk and Keseljevic, 2015). Cheng et al. (this issue) build a theoretical model and ﬁnd
that even housing property rights matter for subjective well-being. Speciﬁcally, using subjective well-being data from China, the
authors ﬁnd that home ownership is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction, although this happiness premium is larger
for people who have full ownership compared to those who have only a minor ownership stake in their home.
3. The contributions to the special issue
The special issue contains ten contributions to the literature on institutions and well-being. We discuss them in the following
subsections: Economic freedom studies; Institutions and long-run growth; and Well-being and institutions in transition
economies.
3.1. Economic freedom
Many of the papers in this issue focus on a particular aspect of the institutional environment, which economists and public
political scholars call economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic freedom include voluntary exchange, personal choice, free-
dom to enter and compete in markets, and the protection of private property rights (Gwartney et al., 2015). The institutions and
policies, or “rules of the game,” that are most commonly associated with economic freedom are related to limited government,
sound monetary policy, respect for the rule of law, private property rights, and open markets.
The most commonly used measure of economic freedom in the empirical literature is the Economic Freedom of the World
(EFW) index produced by the Fraser Institute,3 although several other economic freedom indices exists such as the Heritage In-
stitutions Index of Economic Freedom and the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of North America index. As discussed below,
papers in this issue use all three of these indices in novel ways. Economic freedom is a broad measure of (formal) institutions that
incorporates or is closely related to other measures of institutional quality that are commonly used in empirical studies. Examples
of such related measures include protection against expropriation (Acemoglu et al., 2001), legal origins (La Porta et al., 2008), con-
straints on the executive (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), a variety of indices designed to measure the quality of governance such as
control of corruption and bureaucratic efﬁciency (e.g., see World Bank Governance Indicators), and variety of indices on
democracy.4
Scholars have consistently found economic freedom to be empirically associated with a number of positive social, economic,
and political outcomes. For instance, Hall and Lawson (2014) survey the body of literature utilizing the EFW data and conclude
that out of 402 scholarly articles that used it as an independent variable, more than two-thirds found economic freedom to3 The EFW index is a summarymeasure that combines forty-two speciﬁc indicators into ﬁve broad areas of economic freedom: (1) size of the government, (2) legal
structure and protection of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business.
4 Many of thesemeasures have been used as a proxy for property rights institutions. Bennett et al. (2016) assess several of thesemeasures and their relative ability to
predict economic development.
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tive well-being. Meanwhile, less than four percent of these articles found that economic freedom is associated with a “bad” out-
come such as increase in income inequality.5
Six out of the ten papers in this special issue, contribute to the line of research that examines how economic freedom inﬂu-
ences socio-economic and political outcomes. Bjørnskov's paper (this issue), “Economic freedom and economic crises,” for exam-
ple, explores the association between capitalistic institutions and economic crises. While there is a growing body of evidence that
institutions are an important factor for economic growth and development, the relationship between institutions and economic
crises have been far less studied empirically. Economic crises, however, are an important aspect of economic performance and
can exert a substantial and widespread negative impact on multiple dimensions of individual well-being. Many policymakers
and citizens attribute economic crises to bad macroeconomic policy, but Acemoglu et al. (2003) demonstrate that after controlling
for the impact of political institutions, macroeconomic policies exert only a minor effect on economic volatility and crises. Using
the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) as a measure of institutions, Bjørnskov estimates its impact on several
measures of economic crises for a sample of 175 nations that contains 212 crises and spans the period 1992–2010. His ﬁndings
suggest that economic freedom is robustly correlated with smaller peak-to-trough ratios and shorter crisis recovery times.
Bjørnskov furthermore determines that these effects are primarily driven by the economic regulation components of the IEF
index.
A lingering question in the development literature is how good institutions are acquired and sustained in the ﬁrst place.6 This
puzzle has profound implications for the well-being of people in the poorest nations of the world. Research suggests that foreign
aid from international development agencies to developing countries has been ineffective in delivering economic growth
(e.g., Easterly 2003; Rajan and Subramanian 2008). The so-called Washington Consensus emerged as a set of economic reforms
trumpeted by policy circles in Washington, DC in the late 1980s, based on conditioning foreign aid on the adoption of market-
oriented institutional and policy changes. As discussed by Dutta and Williamson (this issue), research on the effectiveness of con-
ditional foreign aid are largely ambiguous. The authors contribute to this line of research in their paper “Aiding economic free-
dom: Exploring the role of political institutions” by exploring the effect of foreign aid on economic freedom, conditional on
political institutions for a sample of 108 countries over the period 1971–2010. Their results suggest that foreign aid given to de-
mocracies may lead to more economic freedom, but it may have the opposite effect when offered to autocracies; however, Dutta
and Williamson show that their results are sensitive to a variety of factors such as model selection, the choice of controls, the time
period sampled, and the measurement of aid, leaving room for additional research on this important international political econ-
omy topic.
It is by now well-established in behavioral psychology that people who believe that they have more control over their lives are
more likely to successfully cope with adversity, pursue achievement related behavior, engage in morally relevant actions, and, ul-
timately, report higher levels of subjective well-being (e.g., Lefcourt, 2014; Verme, 2009). In their paper, “Give me liberty and give
me control: Economic freedom and control perceptions,” Nikolaev and Bennett (this issue) examine how the institutional environ-
ment in a country, measured by the EFW index, is related to people's perception of freedom of choice and control over their lives.
Using data from the World Values Survey and the EFW index, the authors show that people who live in countries with a high
degree of economic freedom are more likely, on average, to report higher levels of control perceptions. One possible channel
that explains this relationship is the perception of procedural fairness and social mobility. Institutions consistent with the princi-
ples of economic freedom place value on autonomy and reward individual accomplishment with social status. In this way, they
provide the necessary incentives for individuals to maximize their talents through their free choices in a socially productive
way. Since economic freedom is associated with many positive economic outcomes such as higher levels of innovation, personal
income, and economic growth, this can lead to a virtuous cycle that can provide positive feedback to individuals that their efforts
matter, which can encourage them to invest even more resources in developing their talents and seeking success through hard
work.
Tolerance is considered by many to be a deﬁning characteristic of modern Western culture and an important ingredient for
successful democracy. It is also associated with many positive socio-economic outcomes such as higher levels of human capital
(Florida et al., 2008) and subjective well-being (Inglehart et al., 2008). In their paper, “Tolerance in the United States: How
freer markets transform racial, religious, political and sexual attitudes,” Berggren and Nilsson (this issue) examine the effect of
economic freedom on tolerance at the US state level using data from the General Social Survey and the Economic Freedom of
North America index (Stansel and McMahon, 2013). Their results suggest that higher levels of economic freedom relate positively
to more tolerance towards three minority groups: atheists, communists and homosexuals (but not to the same extent when it
comes to racists). The more market-oriented a state's economic policy is (e.g., less progressivity in taxes), the authors conclude,
the more willing people are to let minorities into the public discourse. One possible explanation for this ﬁndings comes from
the Public Choice literature: by taxing some people's income at high rates, state governments introduce tension and conﬂict
(Buchanan and Congleton, 2006), which can lead to lower tolerance towards minorities. In this sense, institutions may play a5 Bennett and Nikolaev (2016a) document that previous results pertaining to the relationship between economic freedom and inequality are quite sensitive to a
number of factors such as the sample, time period and/or measure of inequality used. Hall, Stansel, and Tarabar (2015) provide a review of the literature using U.S.
state-level economic freedom data.
6 Factors related to geography (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Bennett and Nikolaev 2016b), ideology (Piketty 1999), settler mortality (Acemoglu et al. 2001),
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997), legal origins (La Porta et al. 2008), genetic diversity (Faria et al., current issue) and the historical prevalence
of infectious diseases (Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017), among others, have all been suggested as possible candidates for the deep origins of institutions themselves.
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needs of humans, that of relatedness. Berggren and Nilsson's results are robust to numerous sensitivity tests as well as an
instrumental-variable (IV) analysis in which the authors use the average change in economic freedom in neighboring states as
an instrument.
Given that institutional change is often slow and uncertain, individuals living in nations with poor institutions may not be will-
ing to wait for quality of life enhancing structural change to occur. Instead, they may be willing to migrate in search of better op-
portunities in countries with better institutions. In their paper, “Want Freedom Will Travel,” Nejad and Young (this issue) study
bilateral patterns of international migration according to institutional quality, as measured by the EFW index. Outﬂows of human
capital can lead to lower productivity in the origin country and lower levels of entrepreneurship and innovation as it becomes
more difﬁcult for new technologies to be adopted (Marchiori et al., 2013). The so-called “brain drain” has been a signiﬁcant prob-
lem for developing and transitional economies where human capital is already scarce. Using 3,566 observations on bilateral mi-
gration ﬂows from 77 countries, including both OECD and non-OECD countries, for the 1990–2000 period, the authors ﬁnd that
economic freedom is a signiﬁcant pull factor for potential migrants. Their ﬁndings are based on Poisson pseudo-maximum likeli-
hood (PPML) estimation, which allows them to use zero values that contain meaningful information about migration patterns.
Once they decompose these ﬁndings by different sub-areas of economic freedom, Nejad and Young ﬁnd that improvements in
the legal system and property rights are the strongest pull factor for potential migrants. The effect is equally strong for both col-
lege and non-college educated people. These ﬁndings suggest that differences in institutional quality, and speciﬁcally economic
freedom, may contribute signiﬁcantly to “brain drain” compared to more conventional explanatory factors such as income
differentials.
3.2. Institutions and long-run growth
The seminal paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001) on the colonial origins of institutions triggered an enormous research effort into
the deep determinants of institutions and, in turn, well-being. Acemoglu and co-authors argued that early European settlers
shaped the institutions they created in the colonies to suit the physical environment in the new settlements and that these
early choices had a long-run effect on economic prosperity. Subsequent research has attempted to “unbundle” institutions,
e.g., making a distinction between property rights and legal institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005a, 2005b), or pointed to other caus-
al mechanisms than institutions, such human capital (Glaeser et al., 2004; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012a, 2012b). In their
paper, “Unbundling the roles of human capital and institutions in economic development,” Faria et al. (this issue) make an impor-
tant contribution to the research agenda on comparative economic development. Their attempt to unbundle the role of human
capital and institutions embodies three key innovations: (i) they capture institutional quality with the multi-dimensional Econom-
ic Freedom of the World index rather than, as in previous research, with single dimension indicators; (ii) they measure human
capital with cognitive skills rather than with education attainment; and (iii) they use genetic diversity to induce exogenous var-
iation in institutions rather than settler's mortality. Faria et al. ﬁnd a robust positive, and possibly causal, effect of economic free-
dom on long-run growth and, in a horse race between institutions and cognitive skills, they ﬁnd that economic institutions are the
primary determinants of long-run growth. Human capital, they argue, plays a secondary, but crucial role through its effect on the
quality of institutions.
One of the most striking facts in comparative political economy is the positive correlation between national income and de-
mocracy. Since the ﬁrst statistical evidence was unearthed in the 1950s by Seymour M. Lipset in his inﬂuential paper “Social Req-
uisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” (Lipset, 1959), a lively debate amongst political scientists,
sociologists, and economists regarding the correct interpretation of this correlation has raged. Lipset (1959, p. 86) himself inter-
prets the correlation as a unidirectional causal relationship from economic development to democracy. This interpretation is con-
troversial and the direction of causality is not clear: is democracy causing growth or is growth causing democracy.7 One of the
contentions in this debate relates to the fundamental question of how to measure “democracy” over time and space. Democracy
is clearly multi-faceted with different dimensions, which, at times, exert opposing effects on economic and social outcomes (Aidt
and Eterovic, 2011). Dahl (1971) made an important distinction between three dimensions of democracy: political competition,
electoral participation, and civil liberties. Empirical operationalization's capture these to varying degrees. For example, the widely
used Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2014) do not capture suffrage extensions directly, while the democracy indicator pro-
posed by Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub et al. (2010) does not capture civil liberties. The coding issue becomes particularly
thorny when it comes to deﬁning transitions from one political regime to another because the timing of such “transitions” are
highly dependent on what the underlying democracy indictor measures. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and Acemoglu
et al. (2014) argue that the solution to this is to combine a variety of different indicators.
Gründler and Krieger (this issue) are critical of this approach in their paper, “Democracy and growth: evidence from SVMDI
indices,” and propose a different and more sophisticated way to make use of the many available democracy indices. Their idea
is to use machine learning algorithms for pattern recognition (Support Vector Machines) to aggregate the underlying secondary
data. The great advantage of this is that the algorithm learns by evaluating each country-year pair along multiple dimensions
and then aggregates the information in an optimal way to produce a single continuous democracy index, called the Support7 Many researchers are highly skeptical of the idea that economic development and growth is a cause of democracy, includingMoore (1966), Przeworski and Limongi
(1997), andAcemoglu et al. (2008),while others such asGundlach and Paldam (2009) andBoix (2011) present evidence consistentwith Lipset’s original interpretation.
The evidence of growth effects of democratization is stronger and Acemoglu et al. (2014) conclude that “democracy does cause growth”.
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searchers to use from the Supporting Material. As always, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. It is, therefore, important
that Gründler and Krieger demonstrate that their much more ﬁne-grained indicator of democracy can capture variation that
other indicators miss. Using state of the art panel techniques, they ﬁnd a robust positive (within country) relationship between
the SVMDI and GDP growth, and they show that the effect runs through more education, higher investment, and lower fertility.
3.3. Well-being and institutions in transition economies
The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s brought with it a rapid
change in economic and political institutions such as switching from planned to market economies, restoring private property
rights, liberalizing prices and foreign exchange and building new (democratic) political institutions. An important lesson from
this transitioning experience is that while Western style political institutions can rapidly be introduced in society, achieving
well-functioning institutional environment that supports modern democracy requires much more. In fact, in the short-run, such
rapid transition can lead to many negative outcomes including high levels of income inequality, deteriorating interpersonal
trust, increases in corruption, and, overall, lower levels of social capital. In this respect, one of the most robust ﬁndings in the
well-being literature is the large (un)happiness gap that has been documented between people in post-communist and advanced
societies, which, more than two decades after the transition, still persists (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009).
In her paper, “Minding the happiness gap: Political institutions and perceived quality of life in transition,” Nikolova (this issue)
examines the role of political institutions such as the rule of law in explaining the life satisfaction gap between transition (post-
communist) and non-transition (advanced) economies. In particular, merging individual level data from the World Values Survey
with macro-economic data from the World Bank Development Indicators and institutional data from the PRS International Coun-
try Risk Guide from 1994 to 2013, she documents four empirical observations. First, there is a large unconditional happiness gap
between transition and advanced economies that has decreased over time. Second, even after controlling for a large set of socio-
economic variables, this gap persisted until the early 2000s, but has slowly closed in the past two decades. Third, using variance
decomposition analysis, Nikolova ﬁnds that differences in macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, inﬂation, and unem-
ployment can largely explain the happiness gap between transition and non-transition economies in the 1990s and the early
2000s. The rule of law, on the other hand, played an important role in explaining the happiness gap in the 1990s and completely
eliminates the happiness gap in waves 4 and 5 of the WVS (in the 2000s). In fact, holding both macro-economic factors and the
rule of law constant, transition countries appear to be 0.6 points happier than non-transition ones in the latest wave of the WVS
in 2013. The message of Nikolova's paper is an optimistic one: as institutional and market reform continues in many transition
countries, the psychological well-being of citizens in these post-communist societies will slowly converge to the well-being levels
of their counterparts in advanced Western economies.
Fiscal capacity building was one of the many problems encountered during the economic and political transition from social-
ism to market capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe (Roland, 2002). An important element of this process is to get citizens to
pay tax and to avoid or minimize tax evasion. In an ideal Wicksellian world, taxation is voluntary because the payment of each
taxpayer is perfectly matched by the value of the public goods received. In practice, however, tax is coercive because this
match is never perfect; yet, most citizens agree to pay their taxes because they perceive some link to the public services provided.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhini (this issue) break new ground in the study of tax evasion in transition economies. They argue and
ﬁnd supporting evidence in survey data from 14 Central and Eastern European countries in 2013 and 2014 that tax evaders may
be less satisﬁed with their life than others. This mapping from tax evasion to life satisfaction, however, depends critically on how
individuals perceive the institutions that govern tax collection and public spending. For individuals who report that they are dis-
satisﬁed with the public services provided, the sign of the mapping switches: if they tax evade, their life satisfaction improves.
Social capital also matters. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhini make an important distinction between membership of socially pro-
ductive Putnamesque and rent-seeking Olsonian organizations. They report that tax evaders associated with the former have
lower life satisfaction while tax evaders associated with the later have greater satisfaction.
Although political institutions have not changed much in China during its transition towards a market economic system, a
housing reform in the early 1990s gradually abandoned the old egalitarian-oriented housing system and established a housing
market. With a lack of alternative investment options, the housing market has become an important way in which Chinese peo-
ple invest their savings. Rapidly rising housing prices and increasing housing inequality have furthermore reshaped the Chinese
urban landscape, with potentially large impacts on the subjective well-being of the urban population. The empirical literature
on the relationship between home ownership and subjective well-being has thus far produced mixed results. In their paper,
“Housing property rights and subjective well-being in urban China,” Cheng et al. (this issue) build a theoretical model that
links the gradient of housing property rights to subjective well-being. Using cross-sectional data from the China Household Fi-
nance Survey (CHFS) for over 5000 urban residents in 2011 from all provinces in mainland China (except Xinjiang, Tibet, and
Inner Mongolia), the authors empirically test the predictions of their model with respect to a range of ownership options,
including full, partial, and minor ownership, as well as the source of the home loan. Their ﬁndings suggest that home ownership
is associated with higher levels of life satisfaction. However, the extent to which people experience higher levels of subjective
well-being depends on the type of property rights and the type of loan associated with owning a home. People with full
ownership, for instance, experience higher levels of life satisfaction compared to people with only partial ownership, who, in
turn, are happier than people with minor ownership. The results hold even after controlling for a rich set of confounding
variables such as household wealth, migration status, and employment relations. The ﬁndings are also robust to instrumentalPlease cite this article as: Bennett, D.L., et al., Institutions and well-being, European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://
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life satisfaction. Furthermore, the authors provide external validity by using the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey and the
China Family Panel Studies, which allows them to run ﬁxed-effects models and control for time-invariant individual traits
that could potentially bias the results. Overall, their ﬁndings suggest that when it comes to housing, which is usually the largest
investment that most Chinese families make during their lifetime, property rights matter not only in the economic, but also in
the psychological sense.
4. Conclusion
For a long time, neo-classical economists have builtmodels, conducted research, and prescribed policies based on theories that ignore
one of themost fundamental aspects of economic life: institutions, or the formal and informal rules in society that “structure incentives in
exchange,whether political, social, or economic” (North, 1992, p.5). According toNorth (1992), all economies have transaction costs—the
multitude of costs associatedwith doing business every day. For North (1992), how successful a country is in achieving economic growth
and prosperity in the long-run depends to a great extent on how successful it is in creating the type of political and economic institutions
that minimize these transaction costs. As Acemoglu and Johnson (2005, p.950) note: “There is a growing consensus among economists
and political scientists that the broad outlines of North's story are correct: The social, economic, legal, and political organization of a
society, i.e., its ‘institutions,’ is a primary determinant of economic performance.”
Despite many theoretical and empirical advances that have allowed economists to study economic and political institutions in
a more systematic way, there are still many important questions that remain to be answered and continue to be intensely debated
in the literature. North (1991, 1992) himself pointed out many of these questions: What are the deep origins of formal institu-
tions and what is their interplay with culture; how to best measure and model institutional dynamics; what is the direction of
causality; and what are the underlying mechanisms through which institutions work.
The failure of the introduction of Western style political institutions in Russia and Eastern Europe to ignite economic growth
after the transition process began in the early 1990s, for instance, points out that such institutions alone are not a sufﬁcient con-
dition for economic growth. Prosperity requires open markets, but also respect for the rule of law, generalized level of trust, and a
variety of other formal and informal institutions to align well with each other. Spelling out precisely how to move from bad to
good institutions remains an unresolved puzzle in the literature.
The astounding levels of economic development in China over the past two decades despite little political reform, and the suc-
cess of countries such as Singapore where the state is still heavily involved in economic life8 (Coffman et al., 2013), have further-
more raised important questions about the mix of economic and political institutions that is optimal for long run prosperity. The
success of economies such as Vietnam that rank poorly on indices that measure formal institutions, also begs the question wheth-
er and when informal institutions can serve as substitutes for formal institutions. As Rodrik (2004) suggests, for many developing
countries “second-best” institutions remain the best option during the transitional process.
Finally, a majority of the papers so far examine the average effect across countries and citizens. Yet, some of the most inter-
esting questions are usually at the margin. Do institutions of capitalism, for instance, favor only certain groups in society more
than others? Is the relationship between formal institutions, culture, and well-being heterogeneous with respect to the level of
economic development? What are underlying mechanisms that can explain this relationship? Many of these questions will, we
hope, shape the research agenda in the ﬁeld in the coming decades.
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